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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The jurisdiction of this Court is based upon § 78-2-2(3) (j),
and § 78-2-2(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by

adopting clearly erroneous findings of fact that there was no
credible evidence presented to the court that the plaintiff made
payments to the defendant after 1965, thereby tolling the statute
of limitations period in which Mr. Romero could enforce the
Wardles' obligation.
The standard of review in equity cases where the trial court
has made legal conclusions and factual findings is the clearly
erroneous standard.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a); Bellon

v. Malner, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991); Grayson v. Roper Ltd. v.
Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Bountiful v. Riley, 784
P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989), Western Capital and Security Inc. v.
Knudsvig, 768 P. 2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1989).
2.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by

adopting incorrect conclusions of law that the defendant is
barred by the statute of limitation contained in Utah Code
Annotated Sections 78-12-1, 78-12-23, 70A-3-122, and that
therefore the plaintiff is entitled to judgment and decree
quieting title in the plaintiff.
The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for
correctness.

Bellon v. Malner, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991);
1

Grayson v. Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah
1989); Bountiful v. Rilev, 784 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989) and Reid v.
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989) ;
Western Capital and Security Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P. 2d 989, 991
(Utah App. 1989), cert denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
§ 70A-3-122 Utah Code Ann,
(1)

Accrual of cause of action.

A cause of action against a make or an acceptor accrues
(a) in the case of a time instrument on the day after

maturity;
•(b)

in the case of a demand instrument upon its date

or, if no date is stated, on the date of issue.
(2)

A cause of action against the obligor of a demand or

time certificate of deposit accrues upon demand, but demand on a
time certificate may not be made until on or after the date of
maturity.
(3)

A cause of action against a drawer of a draft or an

indorser of any instrument accrues upon demand following dishonor
of the instrument.
(4)

Notice of dishonor is a demand.

Unless an instrument provides otherwise, interest runs

at the rate provided by law for a judgment.
(a) in the case of a maker, acceptor or other primary
obligor of a demand instrument, from the date of demand;
(b) in all other cases from the date of accrual of the
cause of action.
2

§ 78-12-1 Utah Code Ann,

Time for commencement of actions

generally.
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation is
prescribed by statute.
§ 78-12-23 Utah Code Ann.

Within six years - Mesne profits

of real property - Instrument in writing - Distributing of
criminal proceeds to victim.
Within six years:
(1)

An action for the mesne profits of real property.

(2)

An action upon any contract, obligation, or liability

founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in
Section 78-12-22.
(3)

An action instituted under Section 78-12-12.5 regarding

distribution of criminal proceeds to any victim.
§ 78-12-44 Utah Code Ann.

Effect of payment,

acknowledgment, or promise to pay.
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the
principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment
of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay
the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought within
the period prescribed for the same after such payment,
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise
must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby.
When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any

3

statute, it shall be unavailable either as a cause of action or
ground of defense.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case.

This action was brought by Respondents ("Plaintiffs" or
"Wardles") to quiet title to certain real property located in
Davis County, Utah.

In response, Appellant ("Defendant" or

"Romero") counterclaimed to foreclose on the property.
B.

Course of Proceeding

Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this action in January,
1994.

Plaintiffs had difficulty in locating and serving

defendant and as result, obtained an order allowing publication
and service by mail.

Shortly thereafter, default judgement

against defendant and decree quieting title in plaintiffs was
entered.

Thereafter, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, Second

District Court Judge denied Defendant's Motion to set Aside
Judgement and Decree Quieting Title in Plaintiffs.

The Utah

Court of Appeals then reversed the trial court's order denying
defendant's motion to set aside the judgment and decree quieting
title in the plaintiffs.

Thereafter, plaintiffs filed an amended

complaint and the defendant filed a counterclaim to foreclose on
plaintiffs' property.
The Honorable Rodney S. Page denied the plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgement on the basis that there were genuine issue

4

of material fact concerning whether the statute of limitations
had run.
C.

Disposition of the Trial Court

The matter was tried before the Honorable Rodney S. Page
sitting without a jury, on November 1, 1996.

At the conclusion

of trial, Judge Page ruled from the bench that plaintiffs' title
in the subject property was quieted against the defendant and
persons claiming under him.

The order and decree was entered on

December 10, 1996.
D.
1.

Statement of Facts
In March, 1960, the defendant, Lester Romero, and his

then wife, Maxine Romero, negotiated with Glen D. Wardle and
Thora Wardle for the sale of a house and lot situated in North
Salt Lake, Utah at 320 East Center Street, more particularly
described as follows:
All of Lot 39 Hillside Gardens Subdivision, a
subdivision of part of Sections 11 and 12, Township 1
North Range 1 West, Salt Lake Meridian. (subject
property). 1
2.

Thereafter, by Warranty Deed dated March 15, 1960, and

recorded in the office of the Davis County recorder, Farmington,
Utah on March 16, 1960, in Book 184 of official records at page
115, Lester Romero and Maxine Romero conveyed the subject
property to Glen D. Wardle and Thora Wardle as joint tenants.2

1

Findings, paragraph 1.

2

Findings, paragraph 2.
5

3.

The Defendant recorded a Quit-Claim Deed dated March 1,

I960, on May 24, 1993, wherein Glen D. Wardle and Thora Wardle
are named as grantors and Lester Romero is named as grantee of
the subject premises.

Romero also recorded on May 24, 1993, a

"Trust Deed" dated March 1, 1960, wherein the subject premises as
securing a note in the sum of $6,000.00.

Plaintiffs denied

executing the Quit-claim Deed, the Trust Deed and the Promissory
Note dated March 1, 1960.

Plaintiffs claimed that the obligation

due to Lester Romero and Maxine Romero as of March 1960 was
$5,400.00 payable at the rate of $100.00 per month.3
4.

Romero claims he received a promissory note for

$6,000.00, secured by a deed of trust on the Property.

He also

received a signed quitclaim deed conveying the Property back to
him, which he could record if Plaintiffs did not pay as
promised.4
5.

The Wardles claimed that they executed a mortgage in

favor of defendant for $5,400.00 to secure payment of the
obligation.5
6.

The Mortgage relied upon by the plaintiffs is an

unsigned "conformed copy" and not the original.6

3

Findings, paragraph 3.

4

Rt. 126-30.

5

Rt. 13-14.

6

Rt. 31-32.
6

7.

During the next several years the Wardles were rarely

prompt in paying their obligations as required by the promissory
note .7
8.

It is undisputed that the Wardles made payments on the

obligation up until at least 1965.8
9.

The Wardles claim that no payments were made after

1965.9
10.

Romero never allowed more than three (3) years to

elapse without collecting a payment.10
11.

Romero claims that the Promissory Note remained

constantly delinquent.11
12.

On May 24, 1993, Mr. Romero, being unable to convince

Plaintiffs of their remaining obligation, recorded the quitclaim
deed.12
13.

The plaintiffs' obligation to defendant was

acknowledged in writing by the plaintiffs in 1980.13

7

Rt. 131-134, 152-156.

8

Findings, paragraph 4.

9

Rt. 12.

10

Rt. 131-34, 152-56.

11

Rt. 131-34, 152-56.

12

Findings, paragraph 3.

13

Findings, paragraph 6.
7

14.

Defendant met with the plaintiffs in 1980 to discuss

payment of the remaining amount due on the Note.14
15.

Plaintiffs, as a result of that meeting, mailed

defendant a check for the $5,173.40 they claimed was the
remaining amount due on the Note and asked for a full release of
defendant's lien on the Property.
16.

Romero returned the check to the plaintiffs because it

was less than the total amount then owing.

However, Romero

continued receiving payments up until 1991.15

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Romero appeals on the basis that the evidence at trial
did not support the trial court's findings that no payments were
made by the Wardles or received by Mr. Romero after 1965, and as
a result the statute of limitations had run on Mr. Romero's right
to enforce the Wardles' obligation.

It is the position of Romero

that the great weight of evidence clearly showed that payments
were in fact received from the Wardles on the obligation, which
tolled the statute of limitations and it was reversible error for
the lower court to rule otherwise.

Rt. 33-35.
Rt. 131-34, 152-56.
8

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENDANT'S
COUNTERCLAIM WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND
THEREFORE THE PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO A DECREE
QUIETING TITLE TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
POINT I
The Trial Court's Finding That There Were no Payments Made By
Plaintiffs After 1965 is Against the Great Weight of Evidence
Presented at Trial.
The trial court entered a single finding, Finding No. 4,
regarding the credibility of evidence of payment of the
obligation by the Wardles to Romero.16

The trial court simply

found that because of the conflicting testimony regarding payment
of the obligation after 1965, Romero said he received several
payments, Mrs. Wardle said no payments were made, that the only
possible evidence before the court was the payment schedule
maintained by Romero which was received as part of plaintiff's
Exhibit 18, and as a result, the credibility of that payment
schedule would be determinative.17
After comparing plaintiff's Exhibit 18 with the checks and
receipts maintained by plaintiff and entered and received as
defendant's Exhibit 12, the trial court found that because of the
inconsistencies between the two sets of documents, that Romero's
payment schedule (Plaintiff's Exhibit 18) was therefore not

Findings, paragraph 4.
Id.
9

worthy of any credibility as far as the court was concerned.18
This finding by the trial court, was based entirely on the
(1

l

assumption that the plaintiff^s checks and receipts as set forth
in defendant's Exhibit 12 was the undisputable and established
starting point from which to determine the credibility of
Romero's payment schedule (Plaintiff's Exhibit 18). As set forth
below, such an assumption was unreasonable under the
circumstances and not supported by the evidence.
Romero challenges both Finding No. 4 and the resulting
Conclusions of Law.

Romero acknowledges that the trial court's

findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous19,
however, the conclusions of law are not entitled to the same
level of deference; a correction of error standard applies to
conclusions of law.20

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if

it is against the great weight of evidence or if the reviewing
court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake
has been made.21

"Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the

appellant can show that they are without adequate evidentiary
foundation or if they are induced by an erroneous view of the

18

Id.

19

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52 (a) .

20

Gravson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah

1989) .
21

Bountiful v. Rilev 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989) citing
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
10

law."22

A finding is deemed clearly erroneous if this Court

concludes that it is against the clear weight of the evidence.23
The standard of review of findings of fact is governed by
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The rationale

of the Rule is revealed by its language:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
A.

The Evidence Fails to Support Finding Number 4
Regarding Credible Evidence of Payments by Plaintiffs
after 1965,

To successfully challenge the trial court's finding, Romero
must marshall all the evidence supporting the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support
it even when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court.24

In this section, therefore, Romero will review

all of the evidence of which he is aware that supports finding
No. 4 and will in this and subsequent sections demonstrate that
the evidence is insufficient.

22

Western Capital and Security Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d
989, 991 (Utah App. 1989), cert denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989)
citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
23

Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899900 (Utah 1989) .
24

Id. at 899.
11

1.

Plaintiffs presented no credible evidence at trial
to dispute defendant's claim that payments were
made on the plaintiff's obligation which tolled
the statute of limitations.

As set forth in the trial court's findings, the critical
issue before the court was when and if, Romero received payments
from the Wardles on the obligation after 1965, thereby tolling
the applicable statute of limitations period.25

As a result,

and as revealed in the trial court's analysis, the issue of
whether payments were made by the Wardles after 1965, would be
resolved by determining the credibility of the payment schedule
maintained by Romero and received as plaintiff's Exhibit 18.26
The evidence supporting the trial court's finding that the
Wardles made no payments on the obligation after 1965 and
therefore the payment schedule (Plaintiff's Exhibit 18) was not
credible consists solely of the testimony Mrs. Wardle and her
daughter Maxine Romero.
Taking chronologically the testimony of these two witness
most supportive of Finding No. 4, there is simply insufficient
evidence to sustain the trial court's finding that no payments
were received on the obligation after 1965.
First, on direct examination, Mrs. Wardle testified that the
obligation owing to Romero was actually Five Thousand Four
Hundred Dollars ($5,400.00) and was secured by an unrecorded
25

Findings, paragraph 4.

26

Id.
12

mortgage executed in favor of the Romeros, rather than a Six
Thousand Dollar ($6,000.00) obligation secured by a trust deed as
claimed by Romero. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "3 1 1 ). 2 7

Mrs. Wardle

also testified that the Promissory Note, Trust Deed and Quit
Claim Deed executed in favor of Romero (Plaintiff's Exhibits "
11", "15" and "16") were not related to the transaction giving
rise to the obligation as claimed by Romero.28

Furthermore, on

direct examination, Mrs. Wardle adamantly denied that neither she
nor Mr. Wardle ever signed the documents which form the basis of
Romero's claim for foreclosure and identified herein as
plaintiff's Exhibits "11", "15", and "IS".29
Further, with respect to the obligation owing to Romero,
Mrs. Wardle testified that the last payment made on the
obligation to either Lester or Maxine Romero was in 1965.30
further support this claim,

To

Mrs. Wardle also testified she

handled the Wardle family finances exclusively, that she wrote
all the checks from the family checking account, and that she did
not recall Mr. Wardle ever making any payments on the
obligation.31

Mrs. Wardle testified that she was the only

27

Rt. pp 14-15.

28

Rt. 20-26.

29

Rt. 21-26.

30

Rt. 27.

31

Rt. 27-28.
13

person who did, and could have made payments on the obligation to
Romero.32
On cross examination, Mrs. Wardle reiterated that she was
the only person who made payments on the obligation to Romero33
and also that Mr. Wardle never wrote a check or withdrew money
from the Wardles' checking and savings accounts while they were
married.34 Mrs. Wardle also again stated that she did not sign
the Promissory Note as asserted by Romero.35
With respect to Romero's payment schedule (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 18), Romero did in fact, admit under examination by Mr.
Fadel, that the entry for the 1991 payment was mistakenly
recorded as being received in 1992.36
Maxine Romero corroborated Mrs. Wardle's testimony and also
testified that the amount of the obligation in question was
actually $5,400.00 rather than the $6,000.00 as claimed by Mr.
Romero37 and also that the mortgage (plaintiff's Exhibit 3)
executed in favor of the Romeros was the controlling document
given on the subject property38.
32

Rt. 27-29.

33

Rt. 38.

34

Rt. 44-45.

35

Rt. 47.

36

Rt. 90-91.

37

Rt. 99-102.

38

Rt. 101.

On cross examination, Mrs.

14

Romero testified that she received no payments or offers of
payment from the Wardles after 1980.39
It is clear from the marshalling of the evidence in support
of the trial court's Finding No. 4 that the court found that the
testimony of Mrs. Wardle and Maxine Romero were more credible
than the testimony of Mr. Romero and that as result, there was
simply no credible evidence of payment which would have tolled
the statute of limitations.

However, that finding is clearly

erroneous because it is against the clear weight of the evidence.
2.

Overwhelming evidence was presented at trial to
demonstrate by a clear preponderance that at no
time did a period of more than six years elapse
between payments by the plaintiffs on their
obligation to defendant, thereby tolling the
statute of limitations.

Finding No. 4 completely overlooks the weighty testimony of
Mr. Romero as well as the inconsistent and unreliable testimony
of Mrs. Wardle, referred to herein.

The finding also overlooks

the obvious bias and unreliable testimony of Maxine Romero on
issues which she conceded she was not familiar.

The clear weight

of all the evidence is that at no time did a period of more than
six years elapse between payments by the Wardles on their
obligation to Romero, thereby tolling the statute of limitations
pursuant to § 78-12-44, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).

Rt. 111.
15

a.

The Testimony of Mrs. Wardle was not
Credible.

The weight of evidence cannot be disregarded on the basis
that the court assessed the credibility of the witnesses and
simply chose to ignore the obligation still owing and also
decided to disregard the testimony of Mr. Romero.

The evidence

disregarded by the trial court consists not only of testimony of
Mr. Romero, but also the testimony by Mrs. Wardle that she simply
could not recall with clarity, the critical details of the
transaction at issue.
First of all, Mrs. Wardle has taken the position that the
obligation owing to Mr. Romero has been fully satisfied.40 This
position is simply unreasonable, particularly in light of Mrs.
Wardle's direct testimony that in 1980 and after acknowledging
the obligation to Romero, she and Mr. Wardle used money
originally offered to Romero as satisfaction to purchase an
automobile.41

Such a position is untenable and clearly

demonstrates a lack of understanding and ability to recall the
important details of the parties' transaction.
Of great significance is Mrs. Wardles testimony regarding
the checks and receipts contained in defendant's Exhibit 12,
which the trial court used as the starting point in determining

Rt. 33.
Rt. 33-34
16

the credibility of payments received after 1965.42

After the

parties stipulated that defendant's Exhibit 12 contained copies
of all the receipts received and canceled checks written by Mrs.
Wardle to Romero concerning the obligation,43

Mrs. Wardle

testified to the best of her recollection that she paid Mr.
Romero on the obligation approximately ninety percent (90%) of
the time, by check.44

However, defendant's Exhibit 12 which

contains proof of at least 2 9 payments, contains only 3 canceled
checks.

Obviously, either the payment and receipts and canceled

checks set forth in defendant's Exhibit 12 are inaccurate or Mrs.
Wardle's testimony is incorrect in stating that she made payments
by check approximately ninety percent (90%) of the time.

Despite

such glaring inconsistencies, the trial court found both
defendant's Exhibit 12 and Mrs. Wardle's testimony persuasive.
Further, the trial court also apparently accepted Mrs.
Wardle's testimony that Mr. Wardle never wrote a check or made a
withdrawal from the family savings account while the parties were
married,45 and that it was not possible that Mr. Wardle could
have made the payments to Romero which are in dispute.46

42

Findings, Paragraph No. 4.

43

Rt. 40.

44

Rt. 39.

45

Rt. 44-45.

46

Rt. 117-118.
17

Such

testimony although unreasonable on its face, was fully accepted
and relied upon by the trial court in reaching its decision.
Finally, it was clear from the record that Mrs. Wardle's
testimony that her recollection was inconsistent and unreliable
at best.

For instance, with respect to the Trust Deed

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 16), initially, Mrs. Wardle denied ever
signing the document.47

However in her deposition she

previously testified that she did in fact sign the Trust Deed
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 16), 48

After reviewing her deposition,

Mrs. Wardle went on to reaffirm that she did in fact sign the
Trust Deed.49

However, on redirect by Mr. Fadel, Mr. Fadel

introduced an additional portion of the deposition in which Mrs.
Wardle stated that she simply could not recall whether or not she
signed the documents.50

On recross examination, Mrs. Wardle

then testified that she simply could not recall "which documents
she signed in I960."51

It is abundantly clear that as a result

of the foregoing, the testimony of Mrs. Wardle is simply
unreliable and was an inadequate and insufficient basis for the
trial court to base its Findings and Conclusions.

47

Rt. 47.

48

Rt. 50.

49

Rt. 52-53.

50

Rt. 52-55.

51

Rt. 55.
18

b.

The Testimony of Maxine Romero was not
Credible.

It is clear from the Record that Maxine Romero's testimony
was not persuasive in determining whether defendant's Exhibit 12
was credible.

For example, in her sworn testimony Maxine Romero

admitted to signing Mr. Romero's name on receipts for payments
received from the Wardles which were contained in defendant's
Exhibit 1252.

Such testimony would easily explain the

discrepancies between plaintiff's Exhibit 18 and defendant's
Exhibit 12, the basis upon which the trial court found the
payment schedule not to be credible. However, such critical
evidence was simply ignored by the Court.
c.

The Testimony of Lester Romero was the Only
Credible Evidence Before the Trial Court.

Given the unreliability of the testimony of Mrs. Wardle and
Maxine Romero, the trial court should have based its findings on
the more reliable testimony of Mr. Romero which clearly
established that at no time did a period of more than six years
elapse between payments by the plaintiffs on their obligation to
defendant, thereby tolling the statute of limitations.

Such a

result is not only required under the law, but is also required
as a matter of fairness.

Simply put, Mr. Romero should not lose

his right to collect on the obligation simply because he extended
the Wardles considerable generosity in repaying their obligation.

Rt. 109.
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At trial, Romero clearly established that the Wardles had an
obligation and that it has not been satisfied.

The agreement

between the parties was reflected in the Promissory Note, Trust
Deed and Quit Claim Deed (Plaintiff's Exhibits 11, 15 and 16). 5 3
In addition, the repayment history was reflected and established
by Romero's payment schedule (Defendant's Exhibit 4, Plaintiff's
Exhibit 12) .54

In addition to the payment schedule, Romero

offered further proof in his testimony which indicated the he
received payments from the Wardles in 1962, 1963, 1965, 1966,
1969, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1985, and
1991,55 as well as an additional payment in 1988 (Exhibit 8) .56
3.

The Evidence Clearly Established The Statute of
Limitations was Tolled by Payments after 1965.

The law is well settled that an action based upon a written
contract must be commenced within six years after the cause of
action has accrued.57

Thus defendant's cause of action had to

be initiated on or before 1971 (six years after the date of
undisputed last performance in 1965), unless the Wardles engaged
in some type of conduct which extended the statutory period.

53

Rt. 126-30.

54

Rt. 130-31.

55

Rt. 131-33.

56

Rt. 133-34, 152-53, 156.

57

See § 78-12-1, § 78-12-23, § 70A-3-122 Utah Code Ann.
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However, under § 78-12-44, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended,
if Romero received payments of any part of the principle or
interest due under the contract, then the statute of limitations
runs anew from the date of receipt of the latest payment in 1991.
Section 78-12-44, reads as follows:
11

78-12-44. Effect of payment,
acknowledgment, or promise to pay. In any
case founded on contract, when any part of
the principal or interest shall have been
paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing
liability, debt or claim, or any promise to
pay the same, shall have been made, an action
may be brought within the period prescribed
for the same after such payment, acknowledged
or promise."
As a result of the foregoing, the statute of limitations
does not bar Romero's counterclaim.

As set forth herein, the

defendant's unequivocal testimony and supporting documents
produced at trial clearly established that at no time did a
period of more than six or more years elapse between payments by
the Wardles on their obligation.

Appellant submits that the

pertinent evidence in the present case so clearly preponderates
against the trial Court's findings as to defeat any presumption
in the trial Court's favor, and the result reached below should
therefore be reversed.
It is well established that the Appellate Court may

review

the evidence in equity cases such as the present one, and that if
such evidence preponderates against the lower Court's decision,

21

it will be reversed.58

In fact, in the case of Richards v.

Pines Ranch, Inc.59 an action to establish a right-of-way by
prescription, the Court again found that it was not bound to
follow findings of the trial Court in an equity case where the
findings appeared to be contrary to the evidence.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing substantial and persuasive reasons,
Appellant Romero respectfully submits this Appellant's Brief for
the Court's consideration and determination, and requests that
the lower court's ruling quieting title in the subject property
be reversed in order to allow appellant to proceed with
foreclosing on the property or otherwise enforcing the Wardles'
obligation.
DATED this

rjT
day of May, 1997.
APPEL & WARLAUMONT, L.CL

^

Janjiels R. Wilson
"Jttorney for Appellant

58

Barker v. Dunham. 342 P. 2d 867 (Utah 1959).

59

559 P.2d 948 (Utah, 1977).
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ADDENDUM "A"

Dtt/fl

George K. Fadel #1027
Attorney for Plaintiff*
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
295-2421

8 11 AM 'SG

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY,
STATE OP UTAH
GLEN D- WARDLE and
THORA WARDLE,
)
Flaintif£s,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
1

Civil No. 940700002 QT

LESTER ROMEROf
Judge Rodney S. Page
Defendant.
This matter came on for trial before the above-entitled court
on November 1, 1996f the Honorable Rodney S. Pagef District Judge,
presiding without a jury; Plaintiff, Thora Wardle, as surviving
joint tenant of Glen D. Wardle appeared in person and by attorney
George K. Fadel;

Defendant/ Lester Romero appeared in person and

by attorney James R. Wilson; the court received the testimony,
evidence and arguments of the parties, and beiuq fully advised in
the matter, now makes the followinq:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Some time in March, 1960, the defendant, Lester Romero,

and his then wife, Maxine Romero, negotiated with Glen D. Wardle
and Thora Wardle for the sale of a house and lot situated in North
Salt Laker

Utah at 320 East Center Street, more

described as follows:
1

particularly

All of Lot 39 Hillside Gardens Subdivision, a
subdivision of part of Sections 11 and 12,
Township 1 Morth Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Meridian, (subject premises).
2.

Thereafter, by Warranty Deed dated March 15, 1960, and

recorded in the office of the Davis County recorder, Farmington,
Utah on March 16, i960, in Book 184 of official records at pagp
115, Lester Romero and Maxine Romero conveyed the subject prp.ini R P S
to Glen D. Wardle and Thora Wardle as joint tenant*.
3.

The Defendant recorded a Quit-Claim Deed dated March 1,

I960, on May 24, 1993, wherftin G1«n D* Wardle and Thora Wardle are
named as grantors and T.pat«»r Romero is named as grantee of the
subject premises.

Primaro also recorded on May 24, 1993, a "Trust

Deed" dated Marnh 1, I960, wherein the subject premiccc ac accuring
a note in thp «nm of $6,000.00,

Plaintiff© denied executing the

Quit-claim fippd, th* Trust Deed and the promiccory note dated March
1, 1960.

Plaintiffs claimed that the obligation due to Lester

Romp.rn and Maxine Romero as of March 1960 was $5,400.00 payable at
thp rate

of $100.00 per month./ Accuming that the Quit-claim Deed,

the Note and the Trust Dcod were in fact executed and delivered by
the plaintiff© to the defendant, these were unly as aeuuriLy and
not intended as a conveyance, and iL ia ixuL necessary for the court
to determine the validity u£ the said documents for the reason that
the bar of the statule ol limitations precludes and recovery by the
defendant upon any obligation claimed by the defendant.
4. The evidence is uncontruvea Led Lhat the payments were made
eomewhat sporadically up unLil 1965,
in 1965.

the last payment was $50.00

Prom that puiuL on, the evidence is in conflict as to
2

whether or not any payments were made.

The defendant indicates

that they weref and the plaintiff indicates that they were not.
There's no evidence in the form of checks or receipts which were in
existence prior to that time to support the position of either of
the parties in that regard*

The only possible evidence that we

have is the payment schedule maintained by the defendant which was
received as part of plaintiff's Exhibit 18f and so there is need to
look at the credibility of that payment schedule that he kept in
his own handwriting or someone's handwriting•

It's interesting to

note from the defendant's Exhibit 12r which is the receipts and
checks paid by the plaintiff, that Mr. Romero's statement shows
four payments were made in 1960.

However, the receipts show that

there were at least five or six payments made in that year.
Therefore, in fact, his record is incorrect in that regard.

There

were eleven payments made in 1961 and they matched the receipts and
checks that were in defendant's Exhibit 12.
In 1962, the record of Mr. Romero shows that there were five
payments made.

Howeverf the receipts and cancelled checks show

there were actually eight. Again, his record is inaccurate., 1963
shows six payments were made and that appears to be accurate, and
then the two payments were made in 1965.

From then on, all

subsequent entries made from time to time, about every other year
or every three years by the defendants showing $100.00 payments.
It's interesting to note that from his own testimony the payment
that he claims in 1980 is not shown on that record.

From his own

testimony,

in

he

recognizes

that

the payment

shown

1992 was

incorrect.

He claims it was actually made in 1991.

From those discrepancies, the court finds that this payment
record is not worthy of any credibility as far as the court is
concerned, and with that finding, the court finds that there is no
credible evidence before the court which this court believes that
shows any payments that were made after June of 1965.
The court finds that these plaintiffs were in default at least
beginning in 1962 and each year thereafter and certainly any
payments after those acknowledged by both of the parties in 1965.
The court recognizes, as do counsel, that there is a six year
statute of limitations in this matter and that this statute of
limitations would have run on this matter in 1971.
5. The court finds that there was no effort by this defendant
to collect in any way on this particular obligation until 1985 when
a Lis Pendens was filed. The law is clear that in order for a Lis
Pendens to be effective it must be filed at the time the action is
filed or shortly thereafter, and there was never any action filed,
so the Lis Pendens in fact was void.

Now, that may well be the

fault of counsel, but it is not the fault of these plaintiffs and
in no way can be considered by the court that is in any way
prejudicing any rights that they might have.
6.

The court recognizes that there is a statute, Utah Code

Ann. § 78-12-44, which would allow contract obligations to be
revived.

It provides that if there is a written statement

specifically acknowledging that obligation by the parties sought to
be charged, then the obligation can be revived and the statutory
4

period would run from that date. However, that is qualified.
revival must take place within the statutory period.

That

Here there is

no evidence to support any kind of action that would support a
revival after 1980f and the letter that was sent by the Wardles at
that time to Mr. Romero was long after the statute of limitations
had run. The court therefore finds that the statute of limitations
had run on the note which was the basis of the obligation claimed
by the defendant? that the claim is barred by the statute of
limitations; and that any quit-claim deed which arose out of that
is void and must be set aside and that any trust deed or note which
might have been recorded in 1993 is also void. The court therefore
finds that plaintiffs are entitled to have a decree quieting title
to this property in the plaintiffs.
7- The plaintiffs1 First Amended Complaint alleges a cause of
action for slander of title under the provisions of Utah Code
Annotated

sections 38-9-1 and 38-9-4 and claim entitlement

to

treble actual damages and for reasonable attorney fees and costs.
The court finds that in order for the court to ward such a
remedy in this matter, the court must find that the defendant knew
or had reason to know that

the documents were

provided no basis for the filing of those things.

groundless

or

The court would

find that Mr. Romero was untrained in the law and that he did not
know or have reason to know that they were invalid under the
circumstances and therefore denies any remedy under the statute
pertaining to slander of title.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the

5

following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The counterclaim of the defendant is barred by the statute
ot limitations contained in Utah Code Annotated Sections 78-12-1,
78-12-23r 70A-3-118, and 70A-3-122, and the plaintiff is entitled
to

judgment

of

dismissal

with

prejudice

of

the

defendant's

counterclaim.
2-

The Quit-claim Deed and Trust Deed dated March 1, I960,

and recorded by the defendant on May 24, 1993 are void and should
be set aside and declared to have given defendant no interest in
the subject premises.
3.

The Defendant has no right, title, interest or claim to

the Subject Premises nor any claim against the Plaintiffs with
respect thereto.
4.

Plaintiff, Thora Wardle as surviving joint tenant of Glen

D. Wardle, is entitled to judgment and decree quieting tile to the
Subject Premises in Thora Wardle against the Defendant and all
persons claiming by through or under the Defendant, and permanently
enjoining the Defendant and all persons claiming under him from
asserting any estate, right, title, possession, lien or interest in
the Subject Premises adverse to the said Plaintiff.
Dated this

V^

day of jtmrgmfrer, 1996.

BY THE COURT

D i s t r i c t cjjidge

*
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George K. Fadel #1027
Attorney for Plaintiffs
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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mi. COURT

IN THE SECOND DTSTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY f
STATE OF UTAH

GLEN D- WARDLE and
THORA WARm,Er

)
)

JUDGMENT AND DECREE
QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFFS

)

Civil No. 940700002 QT

)

Judge Rodney S. Page

Plaintiffs,

., " '

vs.
LESTER ROMERO,
Defendant:.
This matter came on for trial before the above-entitled court
on November 1, 1996, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, District Judge,
presiding without a jury; Plaintiff, Thora Wardle, as surviving
joint tenant of Glen D- Wardle appeared in person and by attorney
George K. Fadel; Defendant, Lester Romero appeared in person and
by attorney James R. Wilson? the court received the testimony,
evidence and arguments of the parties, and the Court having
heretofore made and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1. The Plaintiff Thora Wardle is the owner absolutely in fee
simple and is in sole, exclusive possession of the premises at 320
East Center Street, North Salt Lake, Davis County, State of Utah,
more particularly described as:
:;.j Ljvn^ncu

All of Lot 39 Hillside Gardens Subdivision, a subdivision
of part of Stations 11 and 12 f Township 1 North Range 1
West, Salt Lake Meridian.
2.

Plaintiff, Thora Wardle's title is quieted against the

Defendant and all persons claiming under him, and said Plaintiff is
granted quiet and peaceful possession of said premises as against
the Defendant and all persons claiming under the Defendant, and the
Defendant and all persons claiming by, through or under him have no
estate, right, title, lien or interest in or to said property or
any part thereof.
3.

IT IS FURTHER DECREED that the Defendant and all other

persons claiming under him are permanently enjoined from asserting
any estate, right title, possession, lien or interest in or to said
premises adverse to the Plaintiff or in any way interfering with
Plaintiffs full use and enjoyment of said property or asserting
any claim against Plaintiff in relation thereto.
4. The counterclaim of the defendant is hereby dismissed with
prejudice•
5.

The Plaintiff's claim for damages for slander of title is

dismissed with prejudice,
6.

Plaintiff is awarded^costs herein.

Dated this

^

day of November> 1996.

BY THE COURT

!gy3Judge
Distriqy

2

_

